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ABSTRACT
This thesis offers a criticism of the rational actor model in the
formulation of political theory. A critique is offered of Anthony Downs's
An Economic Theory of Democracy which was among the earliest works
attempting to integrate this aspect of economic theory into a political
m odeI.
An encapsulation of the argument of the thesis goes as follows:
There may be systematic biases in individuals' reception and inter
pretation of information. This can limit the explanatory value of the ra
tional actor model by causing the decision-making processes predicted by
the model to differ w idely from the actual processes of society. Problems
with the individual's reception and interpretation of information cause a
greater uncertainty and hence a greater variance in his decisions.
Factors leading to variance from rational choice include increased
specialization of labor, level of technology, and time horizons of the
effects of decisions. Biases can occur both in the way individuals gather
and receive information and in the way they interpret information.
Further, there is no reason to believe the tacit assumption of the rational
actor model that individuals' biases w ill "average out" to a rational
society. Biases may be systematic.
This thesis argues that to more closely approximate the realities
of the modern po lity, models should incorporate elements of social psy
chology and information theory. Some suggestions regarding this synthesis
are made.

Information, Rationality, and Politics
A Critiques of Anthony Downs's
An Economic Theory of Democracy

Introduction
In 1957, Anthony Downs published An Economic Theory of Democracy,
a widely regarded book considered a seminal work in formal democratic
theory.1

This thesis criticizes certain assumptions im plicit in Downs's m odel.-

These assumptions, if erroneous, might call into question some of the book's
findings. Downs sought to provide a model of government compatible with
the general equilibrium theory of economics. His formulation differs from
that of standard economic models in that government expenditures are treat
ed as endogenously, rather than exogenously generated.2 For this, his model
assumes the rationality of individual voters in the same way that economic
theory assumes the rationality of consumers and producers in the marketplace. 3
The assumption of rational individual behavior in the electorate re
quires im plicit assumptions about the information possessed by citizens.
Specifically, Downs's spatial competition model assumes that voters are
aware of the possible policies available to the electorate and that voters
can be placed along continuums of policy preferences.4

The individual in the

model faces uncertainty which can be lessened by expenditure on information.
His dilemma is how best to reduce the cost of getting information and how
best to use the information he has. Downs ex p licitly assumes that an in crease in a person's information expenditure w ill reduce his uncertainty.
Downs does not consider the possibility that the structure of the
2

5

3
polity's information sources may in some cases cause increased information
expenditures to lead the voter farther from rational choice due to biases in
and filtering of the information he receives. There may be situations in
which information can be obtained only from one whose interests run
counter to giving unbiased information.
Consider an everyday example of how this might occur. Someone
whose yard rake is broken may choose to have it repaired. His understanding
of rake repair is probably sufficient to estimate accurately the cost of such
a job. A great deal of information is available both from his own past
experiences and from readily available price and quality comparisons from
other repairmen and consumers.
On the other hand, a man with an automobile in need of repair may
not be as fortunate as the man with the rake. Because he has little know
ledge on the mechanics of automobiles, he may be in some sense at the
mercy of the repairman. He may be charged excessively for the quality of
the work done. He may pay for unnecessary work. According to the common
criteria of welfare economics, the case of the yard rake provides an
efficient allocation of resources while excessive payment to the mechanic
misallocates resources. Consider a case in which the mechanic discards
part not in need of repair. The car owner's welfare

a

is reduced because

he has less money to spend on other goods and has gained nothing for his
expenditure

f

Productive resources are diverted from other uses into produc

ing an unneeded part.

4

Such situations as this are at the heart of debates on the relative
merits of market and planning economic systems. The car owner may
reduce his costs by seeking competitive estimates, talking with friends
who have knowledge of car repairs, reading consumer reports, and so on.
He reduces costs of information by seeking the most efficient system of
gathering knowledge. This is the same way in which the voter in Downs's
book seeks efficient information networks. The citizen cannot be omniscient.
There is no need for him to learn everything about automobile mechanics.
In terms of mathematical statistics, he wants an information system which
w ill most efficiently collapse his perceptions around the truth.
Thomas Jefferson wrote of the virtues of a simple agrarian society.7
!t would not be unrealistic to argue that some of his arguments fit w ell
into the framework of information considerations. In the Jeffersonian vision,
the citizen would be best prepared to enjoy liberty if he had a solid
understanding of the things around him which affected his life .
The modern Western polity bears little resemblance to the Jeffersonian
id e a l. Much of the information about major factors in a person's life is
unknown to him. Information is specialized. Complex organizations act as
information-processing mechanisms. Each individual within these organizations
possesses some knowledge unknown to anyone else. O f course, this is not
by itself new, but it has been argued that the degree of the partitioning
of information across individuals has increased dram atically!

5
A bureaucrat in charge of some program may know the costs and
benefits of his program in a way that no one else knows. Further, if he
is the only source of some of the information about that program, then
it may be very costly for anyone else to try to estimate the value of the
program independently. In some sense the worker within the bureaucracy
becomes something akin to the automobile mechanic mentioned ea rlie r.
The cost of getting information may be more expensive than the information
could ever be worth. It can be argued that knowledge held by one person
or by a small group of people can have a power similar to that of a re
source held by a monopolist. There is no reason to believe that a rational
person with such information would not use it in his own s e lf-in te re s t10
(unless the case of altruism is pleaded).
The liberal b e lie f that the individual is best able to judge his own
preferences is the ethical basis for the doctrine of individual sovereignty11
It would follow that in an ethical sense, it is best for the individual to
have the broadest possible awareness of the effects of his choices. Part of
the doctrine also holds that the individual's judgments should come as much
as possible from himself-not from a king or state or feudal lord.12This
paper argues that Downs falls short in differentiating between decisions
made by an individual and those imposed upon him by others. It also
seeks to examine some of the processes which make up decision-making
in cases of both markets and controlled situations.
Following is an outline of the course this thesis w ill take:

6
1) Chapter OnerDowns's theory w ill be outlined with a concentration
on those aspects related to the previous discussion.
2) Chapter Two: This w ill discuss the process of individual decision
making (given a fixed set of preferences). There w ill be discussion of the
quantity and accessibility and the cost of information.
3) Chapter Three: !t is argued that the specialization of labor, pro
duction, and knowledge in society has increased the cost of information and
reduced the probability of securing desired information. Here w ill be
discussed some of the ramifications of this change.
4) Chapter Four: It w ill be argued that individual biases in information
may not be randomly distributed across the p o lity . Instead, it may be skewed
in a way that systematically distorts individual decisions. G iven this, it
becomes logical for the holders of some information to use it ways serving
self-interests but at the expense of others. It w ill be discussed why a small
number of actors with particular information may act in ways resembling
economic models of oligopoly.

7

Notes to the Introduction

1.

In a 1965 foreword to Downs's book, Stanley K elle y , Jr. wrote,
"Some years from now I shall be surprised if Downs' work is not recog
nized as the starting point of a highly important development in the
study of politics; its influence is already considerable and continues to
grow. " Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (N ew York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, In c .,

1957).

2.

Ib id .,

p . 3.

3.

Ib id .,

p . 7.

4.

These continuums srepresent the various levels of a particular policy
which may be chosen by the government ( i . e . expenditure levels or
levels of a c tiv ity ).

5.

Ib id .,

p . 215.

6.

Welfare here is synonymous with u tility . See Ib id ., p. 17 for a
fuller explanation of the social welfare function.

7.

"..the strong allurements of great cities to those who have any turn
for dissipation, threatans to make them here, as in Europe, the sinks of
voluntary m isery." Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson,
e d . Albert Ellery Bergh, v o l. 13 (Washington: The Thomas Jefferson
Memorial Association, 1907), pp. 272ff.
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8.

Victor Thompson refers to this as the "categorization of d a ta ."
Victor A . Thompson/ Modern Organization (N ew York: Alfred A . Knopf,
1965).

9.

See John Kenneth G alb raith, The New Industrial State (Boston:
Houghton M ifflin C o ., 1967), pp. 27-28 , 407-409 , 4 1 4-4 1 5 .

10.

Downs quotes John C . Calhoun: ”That constitution of our nature
which makes us feel more intensely what affects us directly than what
affects us indirectly through others, necessarily leads to conflict between
individuals. Each, in consequence has a greater regard for his own safe
ty or happiness than for the safety or happiness of others: and, where these
come into opposition, is ready to sacrifice the interests of the others to
his ow n." John C . Calhoun, "Disquisition on Governm ent," Public
Opinion and Propaganda, ed. by K atz, Cartwright, Eldersveld, and Lee
(N ew York: The Dryden Press, 1954),. p. 15.

11.

See Robert A . Nisbet, The Quest for Community

(N ew

York:

Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 224 for a discussion of the evolution
of 'his tenet.
12.

See A dolf A . Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C . Means, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property (N ew York: The Macmillan Company,
1932), pp. 2 8 9-2 9 9 .

Chapter 1
Downs: An O utline

*n this chapter, an outline is provided explaining the central points
of Downs's theory. Especially important are the points relating to the spa
tial competition model used by Downs and essential to the critique. 1
Downs sought to provide an economic theory of the state as a method
of integrating government into the general equilibrium model of the econo
my. N orm ally, government is treated in such models only as an exogenous
variab le. Downs formulates a model defining politics as the selection and
enforcement of the preferences of individuals. Incorporated in this is the
assumption of individual, self-interested rationality borrowed from economic
theory. It is postulated that government maximizes the self-interest of
government officials rather than some notion of social w elfare.

Voting

and political decision-making both are determined by individuals maximizing
personal u tility . 3 The model in itia lly is deterministic, but this is later
tempered by adding uncertainty. Both voters and politicians in the model
calculate the marginal costs and benefits of purchasing information and
make decisions accordingly.1*

From this analysis, Downs derives a set of

hypotheses. 5
Following is a more complete synopsis of An Economic Theory of
Democracy:

9

Downs first introduces the assumption of individual rationality which
is the cornerstone of the theory. The theorist, he says, makes assumptions
regarding individual behavior which may or may not be true in the real
world, but which he believes have explanatory power regarding the real
w orld. The rational individual in the theory is one who has an indifference
map

such that he is able to calculate his goals, given a set of circum

stances.6 He calculates the most reasonable way to meet his goals and pursues
them in that manner. Importantly, the goals themselves are irrelevant to the
definition of rationality; no ethical or positive judgment is offered regarding
desires. "Rationality" refers only to the means employed toward the desired
goals. Downs offers a simplifying assumption that individuals only use the
po litical devices for political purposes. In other words, no one w ill vote
for a party because that action w ill please a spouse or for any other nonp o litical reason. Downs calls this single-minded individual "homo politicus"
after the utilitarians' "homo economicus, " the heartless profit maximizer with
no motives beyond personal enrichment.
Downs assumes that governments seek to maximize po litical support. He
assumes periodic elections at regular intervals, unlimited freedom of action by
government within the bounds of the constitution, and a prohibition against
government interference with the actions of other political actors. No re
strictions may be placed on freedom of speech, freedom to campaign for
public o ffic e , or freedom to c ritic ize the government. Early in the book,
he assumes perfect information

, though this assumption is later relaxed by

the introduction of uncertainty. Government is introduced as a specialized

11
agency within the division of labor, no different from any other specialized
body. Government's purpose is the enforcement of decisions in cases of
disputes within a geographical area. It holds a monopoly on this power
and has authority over a ll other organizations and individuals.
The political party is the organization which competes for control of
the government. It is defined as a coalition of individuals whose purpose
is to gain or hold control of the governing apparatus by legal means.
Downs rejects any organism!c explanation of party behavior— theory?,
treating organizations as single-minded entities— but considers the party as
something in between an amorphous mass of individuals and a unit?

He

considers the party a "team" of individuals who agree on goals so that
each member of a party has the same views as any other member of the
party. Members seek not to maximize party u tility , but individual s e lfinterest. This part of the model is derived from Adam Smith's assertion
that social good comes primarily from private motivations

; Downs says

this is as true of politics as of economics! °ln his model, the private mo
tivation of politicians is to gain or hold political o ffic e . This is accomplished
by providing social goods the party believes w ill attract the votes of the
electorate. Thus, what are generally considered the ends of government
are held to be the means parties use ro accomplish the private ends of
their members.11
The voter, sim ilarly has private ends .with respect to government.
He calculates the benefits he believes he is receiving from government
policies. He also calculates the benefits he believes he would receive

12
from alternative policies. Benefits are defined in terms of u tility income.
This includes not only personal goods the voter receives from the policies,
but also whatever items he may choose to include in his own g o a ls (i.e .
satisfaction from feeding the starving overseas). He calculates the utilities
he expects to receive from each party's probable policies and votes for
the party giving the highest expected u tility income. These calculations
are based on a combination of promises of the parties, past performance by
the parties, and subjective beliefs regarding the future. Important to later
discussion, Downs also considers a possible "party differential threshold."
This supposes that a voter's party differential calculation is not a continuous
function but a discrete one. Below a certain d ifferen tial, he is indifferen t.12
U ltim ately, Downs wrote, the voter's evaluation depends on the information
he has on policies and the relation between the policies with which he is
fam iliar and the relation between these policies and his personal goals.
Parties in the model make calculations similar to those of individuals,
1 3

based on marginal costs and benefits.

The hypothesis is that governments

alter policies marginally so that marginal gain of votes, from increased ser
vices just equals the marginal loss of votes from increased taxation. This is
equivalent to the rational entrepreneur in economics who produces at a level
at which the last increment of revenue equals the last increment of cost.
Following this marginal po licy, the party in power w ill seek to make
its decisions subject to a hypothetical poll of the level of expenditures
desired by voters. In a world of certainty, however, the governing party

must be concerned with the "Arrow problem"

and certain strategic coalitions

of minority parties I HThese may be explained as follows:
The Arrow problem provides that given certain arrays of preferences
of individuals, no democratic voting strategy can resolve issues such that
a majority of the voters are satisfied. Consider the following preference
array: A ,B , and C are voters. f ,g , and h are possible policies. Preferences
are:

A

VOTER
B
c

CHOICE
First

f

g

h

Second

g

h

f

Third

h

f

g

No alternative enjoys majority support for first choice. Any policy chosen
faces a majority of the electorate which prefers another particular po licy.
For example, if policy f is chosen, voters B and C prefer policy h. Here,
the only task of an opposition party is to w ait until such a situation arises,
endorse the policy preferred by the m ajority, and w ait to be elected.
Crucial to the argument is the equality of franchise which ranks the
preferences of each person equally1. 5Downs relaxes this assumption by intro
ducing the "passionate m ajo rity." A passionately held minority view may
prevail over a lukewarm majority view because of the political interplay
resulting from this difference in intensity of views. A bargaining process
may affect the government's estimate of the costs and benefits(in terms of

14
votes) of a policy. This process may result in markedly different outcomes
than one where there is no variance of opinion intensity.
Uncertainty is introduced into the model because in the real world
there is no sure knowledge regarding the course of future events and be
cause knowledge of past and present events is lim ited . Downs considers
most uncertainty removable through the acquisition of information but
considers some (such as knowledge of future events) intrinsically uncertain.
He differentiates between lack of contextual knowledge and lack of infor
mation.16 The former is an in ab ility to use data, available or not. The latter
is a lack of data one could use.
The voter may be uncertain because he is unaware

that

u tility in

comes have changed. He may be uncertain what actions have been

taken

and he may be unaware of possible results of government actions. He may
be

unaware of what effect he himself has on government decisions, and

he may be unaware of how others plan to vote.
Political parties may be uncertain because future states of the economy
cannot be predicted, because politicians are unsure of possible effects of
policies, the influence of certain voters, and the policies of other political
parties, and because it is uncertain how much information is required to
influence voters.
Reducing uncertainty requires additional information, and that re
quires expenditures in time and other resources. So, some individuals find
it in their interests to be p o litica lly a c tiv e, and some do not,

depending

on their indifference maps. Because a voter may wish to be informed, if not

ac tiv e, he may look to political leadership for information. Sim ilarly,
government decentralizes its own information-gathering in order to reduce
uncertainty about voters' preferences. According to Downs, the inequality
of po litical knowledge, po litical activism, and political influence modifies
the equality implied by universal suffrage.
Because voters are attracted to particular parties and leaders in this
quest for information, ideologies develop as a way of avoiding an infinity
of choices and, hence, the Arrow problem. The voter no longer needs to
be informed about everything affecting his u tility income.
Downs represents this clustering of views as placing voters along a
le ft-rig h t continuum of p o lic y . This is represented by a spatial competition
1 7

model borrowed from Harold H otelling.

This model was written as a

theory of oligopolistic behavior. It demonstrated that two mobile competitors
(think of hot dog stands on a boardw alk), given a population distribution,
w ill both tend to move toward the mean of that distribution. By this hypo
thesis, two parties w ill tend to move toward the center of a political spec
trum. Downs analyzes this tendency in both a two-party system and a
m ulti-party system with parties distributed along the ideological continuum.
He argues that this distribution is the primary determinant of the nation's
politics. No attempt is made to explain the origin of particular distributions;
that is assumed to result from personal preferences. Changes in the distribution
resulting from changes in taste and changes in the electorate are major
events historically and po litically.

18

Also, parties attempt through persuasion

to move the population distributions. Downs provides an extensive discussion

16
of the peculiar problems of m ulti-party democracies, but that discussion is
largely irrelevant to this thesis.
The process of citizens becoming informed is crucial to Downs's model.
Individuals lim it the amount of information they acquire before making de
cisions. Information is distributed by individuals who have their own s e lfinterests (which w ill, in general, not coincide with those of any particular
voter). So, the voter exposes himself to competing information sources in
order to compare data. He tries to find sources whose values are like his
own. He wants enough information to make an intelligent decision, but no
more. The process of choosing among sources is trial and error, checking
occasionally for accuracy. The voter equates what he believes is the margin
al benefit of additional information with the marginal cost of obtaining it.19
People try to increase personal u tility by decreasing the costs of obtaining
information. This results in further specialization of labor. Professional
journalists, political agents, interest groups, political parties, and the
government itself become specialized data disseminators.
Where voters are too dissatisfied with any po litical choices, they may
rationally choose to abstain from voting. Political parties have to consider
not only the population distribution in ideology, but also how many voters
are lost from the election system itself because of a given po licy. The
voter practicing rational abstention simply finds the party differential
2 0

threshold too high to warrant voting.

*7

Notes to Chapter 1

1.

Downs, p. 115.

2.

Ib id ., p. 28.

3.

Ib id ., pp. 2 1 -5 0 .

4.

Ib id ., p. 5 2 .

5.

Ib id ., pp. 2 9 5-3 0 0 .

6.

An indifference map

is amathematical

orgeometricalrepresentation

of the individual's preferences. It is roughly synonymous with "u tility
function." See ib id ., pp. 3 6 -3 7 .
7.

Ib id ., p . 5 .

8.

Ib id ., p . 6 2 .

9.

Ib id ., p . 15; also see James Buchanan, "The

PureTheory

of

Government Finance: A Suggested Approach," Journal of Political
Economy 57 (December, 1949): 4 9 6 -5 0 5 .
10.

"Man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren,
and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence o n ly ...
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the
baker that we expect our dinner, but from this regard to their own
self-interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their
s e lf-lo v e , and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their
advantage," Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Modern Library Edition
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(N ew York: The Modern Library, 1937), p . 14.
11 .

Downs, p . 28.

12.

Ib id ., p. 4 6 .

13.

Ib id ., p. 28.

14.

Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (N ew
York: John W iley and Sons, In c .; 1951), ch. 1. Tullock wrote that,
"Arrow is interested in the question of whether some given method of
voting w ill in every conceivable case, produce a satisfactory result.
He proves that there is no voting rule which w ill meet this test in
choosing between three or more alternatives. He does not, however,
disprove the existence of a voting rule which functioned unexceptionably for 99999999999999999999999999999 cases out of each 1000000000 00000000000000000000...
...A rr o w was the first to dare to challenge the traditional theory
of democracy by saying that no voting rule leading to rule by 'the
w ill of the m ajority’ was possible." James M« Buchanan and Gordon
Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional
Democracy (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1962), p . 334.

15.

Downs,

p. 64.

16.

Ib id ., p. 7 9 .

17.

Harold H otelling,

"Stability in Com petition," The Economic

Journal 39 (1929): 4 1 -5 7 .
18.

Downs, p . 128.

19
T9.

Ib id ., pp. 2 1 4 -2 1 6 .

20.

Ib id ., p c 261.

Chapter 2
Introduction to the Critique

In the critique which comprises the remainder of this thesis, An Eco
nomic Theory of Democracy is criticized because its particular form of the
rational individuality assumptions may reduce the book's descriptive powers.
This critique argues that it is the information structure of the society which
is inadequately represented, and that this structure is critical to the way
a polity operates. Downs im plicitly assumes that information, while imperfect,
is at least distributed in a more or less random fashion so that increased
information necessarily means better decision-making.
This is analogous to some terms used in statistics. A scientist begins
an hypothesis with intuition and incomplete data. Before he collects more
d ata, any inferences he makes w ill be subject to great variance. He can
never gather a ll available data, but he collects the information to some
point at which his findings can be considered "significant." 1 Statistical
models require that tradeoffs be made between bias in estimation and
efficiency of the estimator. A biased estimator may be useful if its
expected value is in some sense "close" to the true mean and if it collapses
around the truth more quickly than any unbiased estimator. A major task of
the scientist is to determine when he has enough information to satisfy his
needs; another is to determine the optimal tradeoff between bias and

20

21
e ffic ie n c y .
The voter in a democracy can be viewed as following a similar
procedure. He cannot possibly learn a ll that would be helpful in making
his decisions. So, he must determine the optimal amount of information to
g e t. Also, he must balance between sources which are biased but relatively
accurate in news content against those which are unbiased but whose accura
cy is subject to wide variance(bias vs. efficien cy).
There is a third statistical characteristic analogous to the

political

problem— consistency. A consistent estimator is one in w h ic h , as the
amount of information becomes very great, becomes unbiased and variance
reduces to nothing. An inconsistent estimator w ill not co’ lapse around the
truth, even as the amount of information becomes enormous. The analogous
state of affairs for the voter would be one in which his "estimator" of the
truth on a particular policy comes from sources in such a way that even
great

expenditures on information w ill not move him
A common such example in po litical literature

closer to the truth.
is the cost and benefit

of m ilitary hardware. A voter may receive relatively unbiased but inefficient
information by reading newspapers. But, if he wants more complete data, he
may only be able to secure them from m ilitary sources. Such sources are
likely to be heavily biased. It would not be in their interests to divulge
a ll information, so they do not do so. The result is that a citizen seeking
the truth on such a question may not find it useful to collect more data.
The assumption of rational individuality does not recognize this
problem in information dissemination. The assumption has roots in
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Nineteenth Century liberalism, utilitarianism , and welfare economics.
It has been considered a v a lid (if not necessary) tool in economics.
M ilton Friedman argued for its value because consumers and entrepreneurs
seem to act "as if" they were obeying economic laws rationally*

2

It w ill

be argued in this thesis that the way this methodology is used here requires
an assumption that the polity's information sources are diverse and decen
tralize d .

The argument for use of this methodology in economics is that

the market process provides a relatively efficient disseminator of information,
allowing "equilibrium" prices to be approximated. John Kenneth G albraith
argued that in the case of oligopoly this information system(the price sys3

tern) breaks down.

His argument was that in what he termed the planning

sector, prices were no longer market signals but simply figures administered
by the firms. Further, he argued, the presence of vast sums of advertising
revenues overwhelmed other information sources.

Friedrich A . Hayek argued

that a socialist planned society could not maximize the utilities of individu
als because no single a g e n c y (i.e . the government) could handle the mass
of information necessary for the operation of an efficient marketplace.
The government in a planned society would be overloaded with information.
The question then, is w hether, as G albraith said, society is already planned
and whether this distorts information in the way Hayek predicted a planned
economy would. Downs's model assumes an a v a ila b ility of information as it
would be in a decentralized market, not a society in any sense planned.
This thesis w ill c riticize this assumption based on the following propositions^
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1)The rationality assumption is based on an information structure with
a high degree of decentralization. Few would argue that individuals are
actually rational (in the theoretical sense) or that they possess perfect in
formation. Downs assumes that individuals may be off a bit in their voting
decisions, but that the system as a whole w ill average out to rationality
by a law of large numbers. It is argued here that some biases in the
decision-making may not be random, but may be instead systematic.
2) "his thesis doesn't question the ethical assertion that preferences
are not subject to questions of ratio n ality. But, how an individual sees
the options open to him may alter his choices. He may prefer A to B, in
which case he chooses A . But, if there is an option C which he prefers to
both, but of which he is unaware, then is his choice of A rational in the
context of Downs? The relevant question is which system provides the most
efficient disseminator of this information?
3) Downs doesn't considers strategic introduction of information biases
into a p o lity . Here it is argued that certain institutional structures may
foster such biases by creating monopolies and oligopolies of information.
By these terms, to be explored more fully later, it is meant that particular
information is held only by one or a few agents and that these agents may
be able to exact some profit from this monopoly.
The critique which follows w ill cover these and other arguments in
d e ta il. First, a model of individual choice w ill be presented assuming that
individual choice is not deterministic but is partly the result of a probability
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distribution based on the information structure of the p o lity . This model is
compared with Downs's assumption of individual rationality.
Secondly, it is argued that competitive processes are required to insure
that, on average, an individual w ill make rational choices, information must
be available in a way that he is as like ly to vary in one direction from the
truth as another in his perceptions. !t is argued that a more specialized and
technological society w ill be more likely to systematically bias individuals'
perceptions.
"h ird ly, the sources of individual bias w ill be divided into two types—
those resulting from biases in available information and those resulting from
biases in cognitive processes. Examples of both w ill be given.
Fourth, the cumulative effects of of individual biases on the polity as
a whole w ill be considered. A society of individuals with different tastes
and preferences w ill be considered in this context, "his section w ill focus on
Downs's use of Hotelling's spatial competition model.
Finally,

it w ill be argued that monopoly of information is not necessary

to precipitate these effects. The questions raised in the thesis w ill be related
to economic models of oligopoly.
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Chapter 3
Uncertainty and the Rational Individual

This section relaxes the deterministic assumption of individual rationality,
replacing it with a probability distribution. Now, even with a fixed set of
preferences, an individual might be led to make a different choice, depending
on which information he receives, and how he interprets it . The individual's
preference probability distribution is derived and it is compared with Downs's
deterministic rational individual.
Downs lists five of Arrow's assumptions about the rational individual.2
They are: "(1) He can always make a decision when confronted with a range
of alternatives; (2) He ranks a ll the alternatives facing him in order of his
preference in such a way that each is either preferred to , indifferent to , or
inferior to each other; (3) His preference ranking is transitive; (4) He always
chooses from among the possible alternatives that which ranks highest in his
preference ordering; and (5) He always makes the same decision each time
he is confronted with the same alternatives. A ll rational decision-makers in
our model — including political parties, interest groups, and government—
exhibit the same qualities. "
"■"his thesis diverges from the last of the five assumptions Downs makes.
It is different because of the information problem. That is, even faced with the
same information, cognitive limitations can lead the individual to different
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choices. The reason for this is demonstrated graphically in Figures 1 and 2 .
Figure 1 shows the standard curves used in indifference analysis and a
transformation curve representing the productive capabilities of a p o lity . Here
a two-dimensional figure is employed, but the analysis is no less valid for
n dimensions. X and y , the two axes, represent two items of public po licy.
A frequently used example is that o f "guns and b u tte r." Let x represent guns
and y butter.

The transformation curve, which is the one concave to the

origin, represents the limiting combinations of guns and butter available to
society. At any point on the curve, a ll resources are being employed for use
in making guns and butter. Any point within
the curve represents a possibility, but one
in v/hich resources are not a ll being used,
or are being used in efficie n tly . Any point on
the outside of the curve represents a combina
tion impossible for society to produce because
Figure 1

of insufficient resources.
P(x)

The indifference curves represent the
preferred combinations of guns and butter for
individual i . A ll points on

are preferred

to a ll points on Uq , and a ll points on

Figure 2

*R

are preferred to a ll points on Uj

and so forth. There is an indifference curve passing through each point on
the graph.
Empirical evidence suggests convex indifference curves and a concave
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transformation curve. Some resources are better suited for the production
of guns and some for butter. !t is assumed that resources are utilized
where they are most productive. Presumably, the previous increment of
resources devoted to the production of butter w ill be at least as productive
as the next increment. Hence the concave transformation curve. Sim ilarly,
commodities seem to decline in marginal value for consumers as they become
increasingly satisfied with their holdings. Hence, there are convex u tility
curves.
G iven these curves, the individual in Figure 1 would, if rational,
choose point R because this is the single combination of guns and butter
possible at his

le v e l.

Figure 2 shows individual i's probability distribution for x alone.
Since this is a deterministic model and a ll of Downs's assumptions are
im plicitly accepted, the individual w ill always choose the level of guns
found in bundle R. In Figure 2, the x-axis represents the level of guns,
and the y-axis represents the probability of choosing any given level of
guns. In this case, there is a one hundred percent chance of choosing
level R and a zero percent chance of choosing any other le v e l.

Translat

ing this into po litical terms, we would expect individual i to support a
party endorsing combination R and to vote against a party endorsing any
other combination.
This analysis can also be extended to other pairings of public goods.
For instance, the axes may represent production versus pollution control or
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education versus defense. It can represent different policies on allocating
the costs of goods policies. This formulation can also be extended to
discrete functions, such as yes or no questions , but that w ill not be done
here. The analysis is essentially the same, but the mathematics is a good
deal more complex.
The introduction of uncertainty into the individual's decision-making,
though, transforms the certainty of selecting point R into a distribution of
decision probabilities more complex than that in Figure 2 . The information
the individual needs to choose his optimum point is not readily available
or readily discernible. A later section of the thesis w ill deal with the
specific ways in which the information can be flawed, but here only the
distribution itself is of concern.
^he problem can be stated as follows: Out of a mass of information
far beyond the cognitive limitations of any individual , a choice must be
made. Information is filtered by a set of random and strategically initiated
processes and the individual cannot possibly know which process w ill most
e ffic ie n tly lead him to his optimal u tility point. Depending on which
information is received and which is u tiliz e d , the individual , even with
fixed tastes and values, w ill probably not judge accurately the transformation
curve representing the society's available choices. In effect, a nearly infinite
set of

"phantom" transformation curves can be derived from the information

a v a ila b le , and for each possible curve , there is an optimal point regarding
3

the individual's indifference map#

The set of a ll these points forms a

distribution of possible choices which may be represented in a manner
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similar to the simple diagram in Figure 2 . Technically/ Arrow's fifth condition
is still true, but only under improbable circumstances.
If the individual perceives the same transformation curve on two occa
sions, his values w ill lead him to choose thesame optimum
However, the likelihood of the same information reaching him

in bothcases.
ontwo

occa

sions, and the likelihood that he w ill
Y
interpret it in precisely the same manner
on two occasions is remote. Figures 3 and
4 demonstrate this assertion. In Figure 3,
the indifference curves of an individual |
are represented . The true set of possibili
ties for society is represented by the dark
Figure 3
transformation curve. The optimum the in-3
dividual chooses is again point R. But,
there are a number of phantom transfor
Figure 4
mation curves represented as w e ll. These
are seen as the lighter curves concave to the origin. Each of these results
from flawed information reaching j or misperceptions on his part.
these curves produces a phantom optimum represented by S,

Each of

T, and V . At

5 and T,the individual is led to underestimate the capabilities of society.
Hence, he w ill accept the position of a party which promises too lit t le .
On the other hand, at point V he overestimates the powers of the govern
ment and may be persuaded to vote against any incumbent because no party
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can ever live up to his expectations.
These three phantom curves are merely representative of a vast number
of possible curves. For a better idea of this, Figure 3 also has a large
number of points distributed throughout. Each of these shows the tangency
of yet another phantom transformation curve and one of his indifference
curves. Figure 4 shows one possible probability' distribution regarding Policy
x . In this particular diagram, the mode falls at the point of rational choice,
there is no reason a priori for believing that this w ill be so. In fa c t, it w ill
be shown that under certain condi
tions, it w ill not.

1
P(x)

Downs e x p lic itly assumes that
the information problem is one of
costs; increased expenditures on in
formation or reduced costs w ill con
sistently improve an individual's

0

Figure

5

probability of choosing approximately what he would choose acting rationally
under perfect information.
Figure 5 represents information which provides a consistent estimator
of the truth for individual k . As information expenditures increase (or costs
decrease) the variance of the individual's probability distribution decreases.
The distribution consistently collapses around the truth. In the lim it, we
have a situation as in Figure 2 , where the distribution is a mass point.
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Downs recognizes the limits of knowledge in the uncertain nature of
future events, but otherwise he asserts that “most uncertainty is removable
through the acquisition of information, if a sufficient quantity of data is
a v a ila b le ."

He sees information procurement as a process of utilizing

scarce resources. In his model, voters reduce information costs by designating
certain agents (reporters) within the division of labor to accumulate informa
tion for them. The citizen's chief problem is choosing the proper reporters.
The individual scans competing information ( e .g .

from competing newspapers)

and develops a system of checking the sim ilarity of his views with the
reporting in particular publications. On the basis of the quality of past
reporting, ha makes decisions concerning which publication he w ill read.
Downs's citizens strive , according to these rules, to reduce the costs
of producing information, a process analogous to increasing the efficiency of
a statistical estimator.He describes a stream of "free" ( i . e . costly only in
time) information offered by po litical parties, professional publishers, interest
groups, and other private citizens as w ell as from production and consumption decisions.

5

From these sources, an information-gathering mechanism

closely replicating his own set of values is established. Importantly, this
system is alleged to have "sufficient internal plurality so that its parts can
be used as checks upon each other's accuracy and deviation from his own
6

selection principles."

This is tantamount to assuming an "invisible hand"

for data-gathering— a set of counteracting powers which lead the individual
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toward a rational decision.
This assumption ignores the possibility of a monopoly of information.
One source may manipulate a ll the data streaming to the reporters . Downs
only briefly mentions the biases inherent in what he terms "subsidized" in
formation, such as advertising. He assumes that the division of labor and
pluralism have powers those systems might not possess. Those powers are the
supposed tendencies for the system to provide relatively unbiased information
from specialists in the division of labor. Downs e x p lic itly assumes that such
checks and balances exist in the information system of a p o lity . He asserts
that the personal reputations of reporters w ill lead to establishing measures
7

of re lia b ility .

Specialization, to a great extent, can make this a very

fa llib le measure .
C hief officials of institutions, for example, may have information known
to no others. The information may be of a complex enough nature that it
takes a lifetim e ^o understand. Opinions of the official's peers may not
provide anyone else with a judge of the quality of materials he dispenses
because it is not in their interests to provide this information. Reputations
in complex organizations can come not only from quality of work but also
from a b ility to avoid critical evaluations. It is in ths self-interest of the
executive to give away information which helps him or his organization. It is
not in his interest to give out damaging information about his organization.
Yet there may be no check to which reporters may turn. There may be no
one else in the world possessing the information which can more accurately
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depict society's transformation curve. Such a bottleneck of information w ill
not allow reporters to increase the quality of the information by increased
g

expenditures.

The more that is purchased, the more it w ill be biased

toward the institution's view point.
Downs's assumption can be represented by Figure 6 . The random distri
bution of information w ill autom atically collapse around the truth and the
individual's choice w ill tend toward his rational choice as he collects more
information. In the diagram,
I * and I ' * represent biased
sources whose competition tends
to guide the individual to
rational choice. If one gains,
the other loses, so vigorous
Figure 6
rivalry occurs in which the sources demonstrate the weak points in each
other's reporting. From this, the truth can be sorted.
In summary, in this chapter, it has been shown that the information
problem for the individual can be stated in terms of statistical inference.
G iven the rational individuality assumption, his decision probability function
is a mass point . Relaxing this assumption, his decision possibilities are dis
tributed as a function of the level of a particular policy and depend

on

the quality of information he receives. Information problems causing
variance in his probability function may originate with the data he receives
or with his own cognitive processes. Downs assumes away these problems
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based on further assumptions that rivalry exists between information reporters.
They may in fact derive their information from some central source, leading
him away from rational decision-making.
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Notes to Chapter 3

1.

This model is deterministic in the sense that

any time the

individual faces the same situation, he w ill arrive at the same

solution.

This is fairly typical of a number of economic models.
2.

Downs, p . 6 . See Arrow, chs. 1 and 2 for

a fuller description.

3.

“Phantom1' is used here to describe what an individual might
perceive as society's transformation curve, given particular circumstances
and a particular information structure. It is not the same as the true
transformation curve. There are a near-infin ite number of the former,
only one of the la tte r.

4.

Ib id ., p . 7 7 .

5.

Ib id ., pp. 2 2 1 -2 2 5 .

6.

Downs, p. 218.

7.

Ib id ., p. 231.

8.

"Bottleneck" refers

figuratively to a stage in the path of the

information flow at which the absence of competitive forces allows the
individual transmitting the data at that point to have some control over
which information is disseminated and which is not.

Chapter 4
Competition and Information Skewing

!n this chapter, competition between information sources is defined and
discussed in some d e ta il. An information source in this context is the ultimate
source of data, such as the developer of a particular technology, or a gov
ernment agency overseeing a technologically defined sector of the economy,
or any other ultimate producer of information. The definition of competition
employed here Is analogous to that in the economic definition of a competi
tive market. Here it is information, rather than a physical resource , which
is the scarce resource in question.
It is argued here that if information sources in a sector of interest
are few in number or monopolized, they w ill tend to collect a form of
economic rents from those who have use of the information. This w ill include
a discussion of those types of situations where information monopoly or
oligopoly might occur. It is based on Tibor Scitovsky's definitions of the
informed and uninformed markets.
Scitovsky compares the perfectly competitive economic market with the
market characterized by a breakdown of competitive forces. The former m axi2

mizes the u tility of society's individuals and attains a Pareto optimum.
No one's welfare can be increased without decreasing someone else's. "his
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happens through the action of competitive forces— Adam Smith's "invisible
hand" — by which greed and mistrust of people paradoxically lead society
3

to its greatest attainable good.
The monopolistic market is characterized by the "exploitation" of
those having to purchase from the monopolist.

The result is fewer goods

and higher prices . Here it is argued that an information source should be
expected to exploit his advantage, and it is considered why he w ill be able
to do so. One important note: it is not inconsistent here to assume that an
information w ill be expected to act rationally when it is argued that the ine*
dividual voter w ill not. Perhaps the problem is d e fin itio n a l. The rationality
of an information source or individual is considered bounded by the informa
tion he has. ""here is no assumption , as is im plicit in economic theory, that
the market w ill find the rational choice, even if no one in the marketplace
does. Here is the heart of the thesis: The voter w ill not tend in general
toward rationality in the traditional sense because the the information on
which his decisions depend w ill be filtered through a very few sources in
a given area of interest. The information source, however, w ill have a wide
variety of individuals seeking his information. Thus he has an e ffic ie n t,
consistent estimator of the truth— the type of estimator the individual has
lost, “ his section w ill explain why this is so.
Scitovsky lists several market characteristics favorable to competition.5
They include a competitive spirit, large numbers of producers, sim ilarity in
relative strength, changing membership, and freedom of entry to and exit
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from the market. "rhe competitive spirit is defined as an absence of coopera
tive spirit between the actors in the market.

The actors do not act in collu

sion to manipulate their output as a collective monopoly or c a rte l. Like
Adam Smith's mistrustful entrepreneurs, Scitovsky's competitors find collusion
impossible because each suspects that the others w ill break the agreement.
Each moves to be the first to break the agreem ent, so greed draws the
market price down to its equilibrium point. No judgment is made concern
ing the virtue of the entrepreneurs; it is simply an observation on the na
ture of competitive markets.
Scitovsky sees the other factors as institutional guarantors of competition.

Large numbers of actors make collusive agreements less possible be

cause the costs of enforcing and arranging such agreements increase geo
m etrically as the number of actors increases algeb raically. A reasonable
sim ilarity in size insures that no actor is strong enough to enforce agree
ments on would-be competitors single-handedly. Changing membership in
the market is said to increase competition because collusive agreements can
be destroyed by the entry of a new competitor. Abive a l l , collusive agree
ments require the stability of institutions, and changing membership destroys
that s ta b ility. _rhus, barriers to entry are essential to the maintenance of
collusive agreements.
Consider information to be a scarce commodity. Instead of collusive
agreements manipulating the production and output of goods, it is the out
put of information that is being controlled to the advantage of its in itial
holders. The reporters described in Downs's model do not gather information
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from some great random pool, which would insure certain statistical properties,
nor from an oracle who speaks only the truth. Data must be secured from
individuals and from organizations (firms, unions, bureaus, e tc . ) . The report
er trying to get information on the production of wheat is more or less
guaranteed complete data; there are enough information sources to make
that market com petitive. Sim ilarly, reporters can inform the public reason
ably w ell on items like road repair bids. There are enough sources of informa
tion in that market to enable publishers to gather information comprehensively.
The reason is that probabilities dictate that it w ill be in some actor's interest
to divulge almost any bit of information a v a ila b le . This is demonstrated
effectively in the neoclassical economic model.
On the other hand, when information sources are few it can be expec
ted that some manipulation w ill occur, just as it can be expected that where
few producers of a good exist, they w ill be exploit to exploit this advantage
over consumers. An example can be found in recent controversies concerning
the long-term effects of some chemicals. Firms have withheld information
from the government and from consumers and even from their own workers
7

because of profit motives.

O nly the individual firms held the information

showing the dangers of their products, so they were information monopolists.
A particular individual in society might prefer to allow a small amount of
chemical dumping in exchange for the benefits of the product if he were
fu lly informed. But, because the company offers him information regarding
the benefits but not the true costs in terms of environmental and health

effects, he votes to allow a greater amount of dumping. In this w ay, the
firm is reaping a monopoly profit from its information advantage. Here
profit is not derived from any monopoly on a physical resource.
Figure 7 utilizes the now -fam iliar probability distribution to demon
strate this point graphically. Again,
R represents the level of x (here
pw
the amount of chemicals to be
dumped ) he would choose under
perfect information, “ he first
probability distribution represents
his in itia l decision function, show
ing a high degree of uncertainty on

Figure 7

his part. At this point, he is not
very knowledgeable on the subject of chemical dumping.
The second probability distribution represents his curve after he has
gathered more information . However, at the level of complexity he has
now sought, much of the information he desires can only come from the
firm its e lf. Therefore, his distribution begins to skew toward the position I
taken by the firm, which naturally wishes to dump a great deal of chemical
“ he third distribution represents the individual's function after he has read
a great deal on the subject. However, most of the later data on which
he based his choice came from the firm so it was strategically filtered
to bias it toward the firm's position. Because he has essentially been re
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ceiving propaganda, his position is biased toward the firm's position. Thus,
no conceivable amount of information expenditure w ill lead him to a
rational decision. If his funds were unlim ited, he could set up his own lab
oratory and run his own tests, but that is not a feasible option. The report
ers on whom he relies for information are now inconsistent estimators of the
truth.
The next task is to categorize those types of information markets which
should tend to enable reporters to report consistently and those which should
produce increasingly biased information as more information is gathered. For
this, we return to Scitovsky.
He describes a dichotomy (or continuum) between an "informed market"
and an'Uninformed m arket." These are defined as follows:
The informed market is a market in which the average buyer knows
enough about the quality of the goods and services offered to ap
praise them on their own merits without relying on trade-marks, ad
vertisements, or the reputation of the producers or s e lle rs ...In general
one might say that the market for any good whose appraisal requires
little or no technical, chem ical, m edical, or other specialized
knowledge, or requires knowledge that is quickly and easily acquired,
is an informed market.8
A market is uninformed when the average buyer in the market has an
incomplete idea of the nature of the goods or services he buys, and
judges their quality not by his own standards, but on the basis of
advertising and indexes of q u a lity . By index of q u ality , we m e a n ...
anything by which the uninformed buyer is likely to judge quality.9
The tendency toward the unknown market w ill result from the advent of
high technology, scale economies, and other factors likely to prevent the
consumer from making a rational choice. Considering this concept in the
government arena, the problem is as follows: An informed market is one in
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which the voter is qualified to judge the performance of his elected officials
directly or at least where reporters are able to do so and are forced to re
veal the most accurate possible information because of competition. This might
involve street repairs versus lower taxes. A relatively competitive newsgathering system in this informed market can convey rather w ell what the
costs of repair should be. The average c itiz e n , unable to estimate the costs
himself, can nevertheless reach a close approximation in this w ay. "he more
he reads, the more he knows.
"he uninformed market for government is illustrated by the choice among
advanced m ilitary systems. The voter is unable to judge by any standards of
his own whether one system is better than any other. He cannot, acting
alone, determine how much must or should be spent on defense.10

He must

depend on information gathered by others, some of whom are acting under a
cloak of o ffic ia lly sanctioned secrecy, and many of whom have an economic
or political stake in the outcome. T ypically, the reports w ill reach him through
the media. Unfortunately, there are bottlenecks throughout this network of
news-gathering. Members of Congress might be at the mercy of what Dwight
Eisenhower termed the m ilitary-industrial complex. There may be a consensus
among defense industry and m ilitary leaders concerning which information to
11
release.

Secrecy prevents other contractors from competing effectively for

contracts, even in competitors are a v a ila b le . Where bottlenecks of informa
tion occur, private motives might be expected to override public motives.
A m ilitary leader who is the acknowledged expert on a particular weapons
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system may have a personal interest in seeing that system preserved, even if
more efficient alternatives are a v a ila b le .

Perhaps patriotism or other forms of

altruism might prevail over the private motive, but here the point is that this
need not be the case. In fa c t, the later section on cognitive biases w ill show
how such a person might support retaining a weapons system whose obsolescence
threatens national security even if he does not mean to do so. An explanation
w ill be offered.
Scitovsky observes that free competition requires freedom of entry into
occupations and professions.

12

Under specialization, the freedom of entry to

and exit from them become severely lim ited. Workers require lengthy training
to perform their jobs. As the length of training time increases with high
technology, workers feel less able to change jobs because of the necessity
of starting at the bottom of an organization once more. Even in assemblyline operations where the ultimate specialization reduces training time by
breaking tasks down into the simplest operations, those in management re
quire still greater knowledge of their industry because they must oversee so
many operations. The fear of losing one's managerial job leads to a protective
1 3

mentality in complex organizations— the fam iliar turf defenses of bureaucracy.
The relationship between information competitiveness and specialization

may be a simple arithmetic one. In a highly com plex, bureaucratized society
there may simply not be enough reporters to go around— not enough agents in
a specialty to insure valid comparisons of q u ality . In the economic market
place, the result is the replacement of valid quality comparison techniques
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with a rtific ia l methods. This may include superficial differentiation like car
style changes, non informative advertising, and the development of a rtific ia l
quality indexes (e .g . price).

14

Similar characteristics can be seen in the

political market. The individual voter finds himself confounded by the com
plexity of the issues he must consider. He is unable to determine rationally
the differences between political candidates and turns to superficial means of
judging— rhetoric, gossip, physical appearance, candidate's fam ily, endorse
ments, noninformative advertising, e tc . Sim ilarly, elected officials experience
the same difficulties in trying to determine the relative virtues of public
policy alternatives. A Congressman relies on his own set of reporting systems
15
*o inform him.

The bureaucracy expands to provide this reporting system.

Bureaucratic theory has shown how this may lead to a profusion of information
bottlenecks and the fam iliar bureaucratic atrophy can result.
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In this section, it has been shown that the data reaching people may
be biased due to structural features in the information market. This can be
considered analogous to the market for goods because in both, a scarce
commodity is being distributed by producers according to perceptions of
self-interest, and the structure of the market.
Scitovsky lists a number of structural features conducive to competition.
In the absence of these features, a market is susceptible to monopolistic
exploitation. An information monopolist may try to deceive the consumer by
strategically biasing information in a way that hides true costs and benefits
of a particular action. In such cases, the individual's "rational" choice may
be skewed away* from that choice he would make if perfectly informed. At

the root of the monopolizing of information is the complexity brought about
by technology and specialization. The less the individual is able to comprehend
the facts relevant to his choices, the more like ly he w ill be susceptible to
information manipulation. !n such cases, he w ill turn to false benchmarks to
aid him in judging qualitative questions. Not only is the citizen susceptible
to these problems; political officials too must rely on monopolized sources of
information.
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Chapter 5
Collusion and Parallelism

The arguments up to this point have centered on those situations in_
which information affecting citizens' rational choices has been controlled
by a single monopolist. It can be argued that such situations are rare, that
any information is generally available to more than one source. Supposedly,
competitive forces should overcome systematic biases, but here it is argued
that they do not. Where data sources have a higher probability of rational
choice than consumers of data, it can be expected that they w ill manipulate
information according to self-interests. Where two or more actors have access
to the same information, they can be expected to act in collusive or parallel
fashion if an agreement, overt or ta c it, can be reached and enforced. The
case is like an oligopolistic economic market.
Oligopoly can be called the most "p olitical" form of economic market;
it is one in which the interplay between actors most closely resembles political
bargaining. No attempt is made here to apply oligopoly models directly to
po litical situations. They are presented only to suggest past attempts at model
ling the actions of the few .
The po litical-oligopolistic nexus is implied by the identifying characteris
tics of the la tte r. These center about the small number of actors able to
visibly affect the market. W hile there may be thousands of actors, only those
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few with this market power are defined as the oligopolists. There is strategic
interplay between these actors, because they are aware that the decisions of
each w ill affect the decisions of the others. They may recognize large areas
of shared interests where a ll maximize gains by acting in harmony. Where
they have at least partially conflicting interests, the resulting competition
is likely to decay into a rivalry of conflicting w ills . Actions take on a game
like quality with optimizing actions taking the form of moves based on expec
tations of the responses of others in the market, a situation very different
from the classic competition.
There is a great sim ilarity between this type of economic market and
the arena of political interplay. In the la tte r, the number of actors is almost
always small, whether they are nations, candidates, lobbying groups, po litical
parties, or individuals. W hile there may be thousands of individuals writing
letters or fighting in armies, or participating in some way in the political
interplay, the number of primary actors whose decisions dictate the course of
events is generally sm all. They recognize this strategic nature of their de
cisions. Lobbyists for one side of an issue calculate the likely response of
their opponents to each possible course of action. Nations calculate the
probable moves of rival nations in response to their own moves. Political
campaigns are plotted as carefully as games of chess. Throughout politics,
conflicts are defined by the tests of w ill and strengths and weaknesses of
actors whether persons or groups.
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Economic theories of oligopoly are concerned with the ways In which
actors come to recognize the mutuality of their interests and the strategies
they employ in arriving at agreements on serving these mutual interests.
Cartel theory considers the increasing d ifficu lty of negotiating and enforcing
agreements between actors as their numbers increase. 2

To date, no one

theory of oligopoly is widely favored by economists, and some argue that
to develop a universal theory is not possible. The existing ones used for
empirical observations consider the rates at which firms provide goods in
the m arketplace. Sim ilarly, this chapter outlines the strategies of informa
tion dissemination given a limited number of sources.
If a po litical market includes several actors with conflicting interests,
why w ill they not lead society to an optimum through their rivalry? Why
won't a regulatory agency's conflict with an industry lead to a social opti
mum? Why won't the rivalry between Republicans and Democrats lead the
individual to a rational choice? The answer lies in the weakness of what
G albraith termed "countervailing powers," a weakness which w ill be called
here "the bifurcation of the political market into competitive and coopera
tive axes.
Consider diagrams 8 through 12. In Figure 8 , there is the probability
distribution for voter i on Policy x , and it is assumed that there is a great
deal more information available to i than he already possesses. !n Figure
9 , he has received some information from a source whose self-interest lies
in maximizing the quantity of x , and his probability function has become
biased toward the direction of the information source. In Figure 10, there

52
p(x)
P(x)

p(x)
p(x) from Fig. 8

Figure 8
R
High degree of uncertainty in the
agent's probability distribution p(x)

Figure 9
R
New information from biased source
source (I) only

p(x)

Figure 10
Countervailing power (C)
added: leads to un
biased information

p(x,y)

p(x,y)

jflklX

/

Is/C '
1
c

V

/ R

z

&c

z
1_

L

Figure 11
^Collusion fails on x -a x is ,
Succeeds on z-axis: x decision
unbiased, z decision biased

Figure 12
Collusion fails on both x and z-axes: both decisions
unbiased

53
is

a competitive

force whose interest lies in minimizing x . The countervail

ing power may be a rival political party or interest group * a regulatory
agency, or any other competitive force. Rivalry between the two interests
might be expected to lead the voter to a rational choice by allowing him,
as in P2M ,

toward R. In Figure 11, though, the two sources have recognized

points of mutual interest, and the market has bifurcated into two axes. Along
axis x , the two are still in conflict— there is no area for collusive actions.
Here the voter receives the to tality of information, so his decision should
not be biased. On the z-axis (which would be perpendicular to the paper)
the two sources have recognized mutual interests on which they collude or
act in paraHel fashion. Along this axis, the release of information to
society w ill be of an indeterminate nature. If the two rivals are able to
reach an overt or tacit agreement, then voters w ill receive biased information.
If they are unable to agree,

as *n Figure 12, where collusion fails,

the two

w ill be rivalrous on both axes and all information w ill be unbiased. The
way the rivals w ill agree to collude or w ill fail to is indeterm inate. In
economic oligopoly, markets and prices may resemble either competitive or
monopolistic markets or anything between. Sim ilarly, the solution of the
po litical oligopoly may be either polar example or anything between.
There is a wide body of literature on the failure of competitve forces.
Huntington's study of the Interstate Commerce Commission (IC C ) is a good
3

exam ple.

Representing his findings in terms of the above model , the

railroad industry is viewed as the information source and the ICC the counter
vailing power. In itia lly , the two acted as rivals, and their conflict led
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voters to relatively unbiased information . regarding the true costs of railroad
service. Later, the industry and the agency came to recognize mutual inter
ests which they were able to separate from those points on which their inter
ests could not coincide. Huntington and others have argued the existence of
a " life -c y c le " for regulatory agencies.

In the beginning, there is a youth

ful sense of purpose to the agency and it vigorously pursues its stated goals.
Later, other self-interests dominate and the former rivals become allies in
some areas of po licy. The rivalry changes to a symbiotic relationship with
both as mutual defenders of their now coincident interests. Over tim e, the
purposes of the two have bifurcated into areas where collusion is advantageous
and those where it is r o t. The economic literature of oligopoly offers some
understanding of these processes.
Assume there are two information sources in some market. The information
with which they deal is complex, and there are no other actors in the po lity
able to confirm or refute their assertions. !f the two disseminate identical
information, the individual's perception of the society's transformation curve
should be biased in that direction. The two sources w ill seek to bias toward
their v ie w , and their a b ility to do so depends on their a b ility to understand
his preferences. If the two are unable to agree on the way to bias him, then
their information w ill conflict, and the result w ill approach a more competitive
m arket.
Follwing are some economic models of oligopoly which suggest possible
results of oligopoly situations;
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THE QUA SI -C O M PETITIVE S O LU TIO N 5: This replicates the information quality which would exist if there were a competitive market for
information, "he rivals are unable to negotiate a collusive solution, so an
unbiased bank of information is provided. An example may be the day a
regulatory agency opens its doors. Its interests and that of the regulated
industry seem directly opposite. There is an esprit de corps among the
agency's employees, and their in itia l desire is to provide a substitute for
the missing competitive market. Though some mutuality of interests may be
recognizable at this stage, the agency does not exploit if y e t.
6

THE C O L L U S IO N S O L U T IO N

: Here, the two agents have recognized

the mutual interests and have begun to cooperate fully with each other,
information is distributed through society as if the colluding agents were a
single e n tity . This is a sort of joint monopoly, a cartel of information. The
solution might be experienced if the two agents found they had no conflicting
interests, for the existence of such conflicts provides a major obstacle to
collusion, in economic theory, a major such obstacle is the d ifficu lty in
determining how the spoils of monopoly are to be divided among the
partners, "hat question of division becomes a zero-sum game among the
agents. The success of the agreement rests on the a b ility to suppress these
areas of dispute beneath the overall purpose of self-interest, ^he !C C railroad case can be cited as one in which the parties surcessfully reached
a comfortable collusion.
7

THE C O U R N O T S O L U T IO N

: Here, each actor maximizes his own

good on the assumption that his moves w ill not affect those of his rivals.
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This is

a naive

assumption, but may resemble the truth in certain po litical

situations where the rivals simply don't understand the psyches of each other.
They are unable to collude e ffic ie n tly , but recognize some mutual interests
by trial and error.

A case might be two ethnic groups who very slowly

realize similar interests, but only through a long series of misunderstandings
of the other's intentions in each move.
THE STACKLEBERG S O L U T IO N

: This is a particularly "p o litical"

sort of oligopoly solution. Here it is asserted that there are two distinct
types of agents, "followers" and "leaders." The follower obeys the assumptions
the leader makes about him and follows accordingly. The leader assumes that
the follower w ill behave as expected, but w ill allow the dominance of the
leader and maximize his own u tility accordingly. The leader is the one who
determines where the policy (in this case information dissemination) w ill
be and the follower makes the best of that situation. With duopolists, there
are four possible outcomes.* 1) Agent 1 wants to be the leader and 2 wants
to be the follower; 2) 2 desires to be ihe leader and 1 the follower; 3) both
wish to be leaders; and 4) both wish to be followers. Solutions 1 and 2
have determinate outcomes. The leader determines which information is
disseminated, and foliwer accepts that decision and maximizes his own
interests accordingly. !f both try to be followers, their behavior w ill be
indeterminate and inconsistent until one chooses to be the leader.

If both

try to be leaders, there is another type of disequilibrium, one of warfare
between the two until the dominance of one or the other is firmly established.
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THE MARKET SHARES S O LU TIO N 9 : This conjectures in economics
that one rival may have as his goal maintaining his share of the market,
irrespective of profit or other motives. It is assumed this is in some sense
maximizing some longer term goal than simply maximizing pro fit. Political
theorists may inquire accordingly whether po litical actors seek to preserve
whatever "piece of the pie" they currently have. The bureaucratic turf
protection mentioned earlier may be an empirical verification of this. Other
interests of an agency seem to succumb to this long-term goal of agency
perpetuation.
"HE K IN K E D -D E M A N D -C U R V E S O L U T IO N ;1

This holds that an

oligopolistic market should tend to become rigid at some price. If a rival
tries to undersell, his opponents lower prices in response, and no one is
better o ff. !f he raises his prices, no one w ill buy from him and again he
w ill be no better o ff. For analogy, we return to the information duopolists.
A rival w ill
the voter's choice

not divulge information to voters which w ill tend to move
farther from his own position. But, he

might not divulge

information which would move the voter toward his position if he expects
that the rival w ill release information to move him back
a step detrimental

to both

to his position,

rivals. A "truce" between therivals

is expected if

both know that warfare w ill result in a loss to both.

This chapter has shown several ways in which competitive forces in
an information market might break down even if more than one source on
a particular subject exists. The theory of oligopoly in economics provides
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numerous models on the ways in which rivals come to recognize mutual
interests, even in the presence of directly conflicting interests. Oligopoly
theory, though, is ill-d e fin ed and offers no deterministic solutions. It
offers only a variety of suggestions

of how rivals act according to the

interdependence of their actions. Oligopoly seems to share some traits with
politics. A ll of the above-mentioned models

except the cjuasi-competitive

solution result in some exploitation of the information advantage to the
detriment of the consumers (voters). The implication is that even bitter
political rivals may still find some mutual interests to be jointly maximized
at the expense of others.
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Chapter 6
Biases in Cognitive Processes

Up to this p o in t, the individual's deviation from rational choice has
been assumed to result from institutional features. These have included the’
complexity of technology, the degree of labor specialization, the number
of rivals in an area of interest, and the private motivations of information
agents.
The section deals with another possible cause of deviation: the biases
in an individual's cognitive processes. These may be present for a variety
of reasons, some of which w ill be discussed in this chapter. The reasons
include the following:
1) Data regarding the future Qre missing so it is inescapable that
heuristic methods must be employed in predicting probable outcomes.
2) There is more information in any area than anyone can possibly
absorb.
3) There is conflicting information.
4) In a complex society, no individual can be knowledgable in more
than a few areas.
This chapter w ill use the terminology of social psychology for its
analysis.

Social psychologists have hypothesized how different systems of

information can affect individual decision-m aking.1
60

Here, we consider
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the cognitive processes which occur after information has reached the indi
v id u a l. T h e / may be thought of as a filtering mechanism he uses to reduce
his information received down to a manageable le v e l. Following are some
of these processes and their attributes:
I fundamental attribution error: tendency to underestimate the impor
tance of environmental factors and overestimate the importance of personali
ties in occurrences
2)perceptual focusing: the object of focus is regarded as cause
3)advantages of self-presentation:^the perceived importance of the
information source becomes an influence
4 )a va ila b ility : the relative a b ility to extract needed information
becomes a determinant of the decision
5)adjustment: the tendency to alter perceptions by rules
6 Representativeness: dominance of predictive qualities over actual
probability weights
7)concreteness vs. abstractness: visually perceived characteristics
appear to dominate those of a more abstract nature
8)persistence of theories: false in itial perceptions linger
9)congruity principle: the individual confuses his information and his
source
10)balance principle: the individual searches for a schematic regularity
to his beliefs 11
I I )cognitive dissonance: the individual tries to avoid allowing con
flicting information to enter his decision process simultaneously 12
Each of the above can contribute to the biasing of information by
the individual making his policy choices. For the model presented in this
thesis, it is reasonable to suppose that a complex, specialized society can
increase the problems making choices about optimal governm ent.13

A

society such as the United States at present is expected to present more
information problems than

(for example) the United States of the Eighteenth

C entury.
Ross describes the fundamental attribution error as follows:
(individuals) consistently and dram atically underestimated the extent
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to which subjects in general would yield to those situational
forces which compelled obedience in Milgram's s itu a tio n ...
they assumed that the particular subject's obedience reflected
his distinguishing personal dispositions rather rather than the
potency^^ of situational pressures and constraints acting upon a ll
subjects.
This might affect the polity as follows: Downs assumes a level of
professional standards which force reporters to provide information bene
fiting the individual and improving his a b ility to make rational choices.
However, if Ross is correct, information sources may alter what they
provide due to environmental pressures. Even a source known to be in
sympathy with one viewpoint may provide information contrary to the
interests of that side of the issue. For instance, a government o fficial
known to be a Democrat might testify in support of a Republican measure
if he thinks that might help him retain his job. In the Milgram experiments,
subjects w illin g ly performed acts contrary to their moral beliefs due to
pressure from the experimenters. The information source may be overly
trusted by reporters and others when such trust is no longer deserved.
For reasons cited e a rlie r, specialization can increase the environmental
pressures on the information source.
Por the aliened officials In a democrdcy, the implication is that
actions by parties and governments w ill be w idely regarded as manifesta
tions of free w ill rather than involuntary bending to environmental pressures.
A concrete example is the case of an official who loses favor with the
public over issues on which he has little or no a b ility to choose between
alternative actions. For exam ple, some politicians' careers ended because
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they followed the edicts of U .S . Supreme Court on c iv il rights matters;
their demise came even though they may personally have opposed the court
rulings and may have been helpless to oppose them.

15

There are instances

in which elected officials appear to have been blamed for natural occurrences
far beyond their control.1
Perceptual bias should increase in the uninformed markets described
by Scitovsky. The causes of events may become more obscure as the causes
and the events become more complex.

!n fa c t, the causes and events can

become less distinguishable. Social psychology describes a problem of
"perceptual focusing" in which the object of the individual's attention comes
to be regarded as the source of some action.

17

An example is the tendency

to blame an administrator for the actions of an aberrant aide or for the
failure of a program over whose success he had little control.
In the society postulated by welfare economics and adopted by Downs
for theoretical purposes, the free market is the source of private goods and
18
the government is the source of public goods.

Importantly the two are

considered (in the context of the models) sharply distinct. A high technology
society, though, may not lend itself to such sharp delineations. A division
may occur between those responsible for an occurrence and those who re
ceive the blame.

The government may be blamed for actions over which

it has no control while it may escape responsibility for actions over which
19

it has great control.
The oil crisis of the early 1970's can be cited as a case in point.
Some hold the elected officials in office in 1974 to blame for the gasoline
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lines, heating oil shortages, and related problems. Others blame the oil
companies, others the OPEC nations. In truth, it is d ifficu lt to disentangle
the facts from the fiction or to determine with any certainty who is to
blam e. If elected officials in the United States did not begin the crisis,
then the voters should through some process realize this, according to the
rational actor hypothesis. It is- not difficult to think of examples in which
voters erred in judgment about such matters.

20

Sim ilarly, the government officials are not necessarily able to divine
rationally the truth about policy decisions. The process may go even farther
as managerial specialists (in government and in the private sector) must
rely on data supplied by underlings who may have their own private motives
and accompanying information strategies. Ross describes the self-presentation

...im p lic a tio n s may be a ll too clear for our understanding of the
social structures and of the forces that impede social change. Indi
viduals who enjoy positions of power by accident of birth, favor
able political treatment or even their own efforts also tend to enjoy
advantages in self-presentation. Such individuals, and even their
disadvantaged underlings, may greatly overestimate the extent to
which the seemingly positive attribute^ 2of the powerful simply re
flect the advantages of social control.
Indeed, this distortion in social judgment threatens to provide a
particularly insidious brake upon social m obility whereby the disad
vantaged and paperless overestimate the capabilities of the powerful,
who in turn inappropriately deem their own caste w ell suited to the
task of leadership.
The individual believes his political superiors more qualified to direct
his life than is actually so. The official in government becomes additionally
biased as a result of this problem. He overestimates his a b ility to discern the
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transformation curve from the information he receives from his sources and
reporters. On the other hand, the expertise of those sources and reporters
leads the official sim ilarly to overestimate those individuals' a b ilitie s . The
entire information chain becomes laden with such bottlenecks, and each has
the potential to originate, am plify, or cancel some bias.
Three heuristic problems may also bias information, especially in a
complex society: a v a ila b ility , adjustment, and representativeness. A v a ila b ility
bias concerns the stochastic nature of the information sample which the
individual might choose as a basis for his decisions. If the to ta lity of informa1
tion (as represented by the transformation curve) is available to him, he must
draw from it a very limited number of bits. O f course, the sampling may be
biased by the withholding of information by sources. The sampling may be
affected in other ways, like advertising, superficial information, lies, and
various misleading techniques. Each is designed to affect the quantity and
quality of information so the individual is led toward the source's view .
According to Ross, the adjustment heuristic is characterized by the
individual making judgments by first adjusting to some in itia l value or by
some partial computational procedure. He may anchor his views to some
prior data, right or wrong. A political case is one in which an interest
group drives to win allegiance to an ideal which is in itia lly unassailable.
Followers may adhere to this view later, even in the light of evidence
to the contrary.

2 3

It thus becomes in the interests of the source to provide favorable,
though misleading or false, information in the in itial time period, because
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it establishes what amounts to an ideological bunker. In our time , for
instance, early support for the Nixon presidency enabled him to retain a
strong core of followers even in the wake of the Watergate evidence.
A gain, the more complex the issue at hand, the more likely such an
inertia of old information might be.
i

The third heuristic bias, representativeness, concerns the tendency
of individuals to give too much weight to the predictive qualities of
information without considering the probability distribution. Ross presents
the following case:
I (Ross) have a friend who is a professor. He likes to write poetry,
is rather shy, and is slight of stature. Which of the following is
his field: (a) Chinese Studies, or (b) psychology? 2h
He assumed that many would choose (a) from the qualities described.
This is despite the obvious facts that there are far more psychologists in the
United States than professors of Chinese Studies and Ross, as a psychologist,
would be more like ly to be personally acquainted with someone in his own
profession. In statistical terms, he is arguing that where a Bayesian model
is a v a ila b le , people irrationally ignore the prior probabilities?5
Abelson describes the same heuristic is somewhat different terms.26
He asks the reader whether there are more words in English with the letter
"k" in the first position or the th ird . Most say firs t, seemingly because
they are trained to identify words by the first letter, not the third . A ctu ally ,
he reveals, there are three times as many words with the "k" in the third
place. The relation between these two definitions lies in the
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particular details most readily accessible to the thought processes. In one
case, in itia l letters are more accessible than thrid letters. In the other,
cultural stereotypes are more accessible than demographic statistics.
This heuristic could be described as a numerical version of the a v a ila b ility
heuristic.
"the p o litical manifestation of this can be seen in advertising jand
demagoguery feeding on biases rather than statistical facts.
Ross describes a related tendency which skews the person's decisions
away from rational baselines. Someone might be more like ly to listen to the
advice of a friend than that of a consumer publication when purchasing an
automobile. The journal would more like ly provide information of an accurate
nature, but like the in itia l letter or the stereotype, the friend is somehow
more comprehensible. Technological complexity offers a particularly troublesome
fectuue: if this heuristic bias is believed. Highly complex innovations may
require long periods of evaluation such that their true costs and benefits
are not apparent until long after action is taken. If costs lag far behind
the benefits, the former may seem more abstract, causing non-optimal de
cisions.

Jobs in the present may seem to outweigh the costs of pollution

to be borne later. The prospect of unlimited energy at present may outweigh
the expected costs of nuclear energy (externalities, e t c .) .

Present benefits

of a drug (or of cigarettes or of a food additive) may seem to outweigh the
costs, which seem abstract at present. Even Nineteenth Century liberals like
John Stuart M ill believed in limiting the a b ility to make certain contracts
over long periods of tim e. He opposed legalizing indentured servitude on the

68
grounds that the individual, even a rational individual would tend to
discount the future at too high a r a te .27
Ross describes "distortion" and "autonomy" as the perseverance mech
anisms causing information flawed as above to linger in its biased fashion.28
Distortion occurs where weights are improperly assigned to data because of
cognitive fa ilu re . Autonomy is the characteristic which separates the biased
information from its source. The social scientist must ask whether long run
competitive factors w ill tend to equalize entities in the polity or whether
autonomous characterstics w ill lead to greater disparity of power in society.
!f relative power tends to increase, then complex systems of complex informa
tion w ill tend to lead the polity away from
equity.

a

normative goal of equality or

If it is the former and power tends to equalize in the long run, the

question for the social scientist concerns the length of the long run. If the
lag between benefits and costs stretches out over generations, then the polity
may not have sufficient competitive forces to lead the individual to a
rational choice.
H ere, we have touched briefly on a few of the ways biases may
appear as a result of cognitive limitations. Social psychology names other
biases, but this chapter has at least touched the surface of some of the
more important hypotheses about cognitive biases. The conclusion drawn is
that a major obstacle to rational decision-making lies in the limitations
on the volume of data anyone can consume and the makeshift methods used
to sor' out what has been received. The po litical implications w ill be dealt
with more fully in the next chapter, but here is its essence: If the individual
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has a limited number of sources from which to get information on a
particular subject, his decision-making w ill be subject to great variance
because competitive forces are not present. On the other hand, if the
information source has many individuals desiring his information, then
their competition for the data is like ly to provide him with with a good
estimator of the value of his information. Thus the source w ill approximate
rational choice while those seeking his data w ill not. Individuals are
susceptible susceptible to monopolization by information sources. The
monopolist can exert his market power by withholding information or by
estimating the preferences and perceptions of individuals. If he can calcu
late the ways in which individuals bias the information they receive, his
advantage becomes greater. This is one explanation of polling and market
ing analysis. xhe source is at an advantage because in a particular area
of interest he deals with a large number of people while the purchaser
choosing among competitors has only a small number to choose from (in
statistical sampling terms). The voter has to get information from the
sources while they do not need his information specifically; he is only
necessary in the sense of being part of a collective body of consumers.
The result is a distinct advantage for the monopolist of information.
In this and preceding chapters, we have tried to show how a
single individual may be led away from a rational decision by weaknesses
in the system of information upon which he relies. It has been assumed
that the individual has a w ell-d efin ed set of preferences, represented by
an indifference map. The variance in his decision-making has been blamed
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on his perceptions about society's transformation curve— a geometric repre
sentation of the set of a ll possible policy combinations available to the
p o lity . Biases in his information gathering system can be divided into two
types: those resulting from manipulation of the information reaching him,
and those resulting from biasing patterns of cognitive processes. Competition
between information sources reduces the variance of the individual's decision
from what he would choose under perfect information. Lack of competition
increases the variance because he has less basis for comparison and more
biased information. This lack of competition arises from an increasing
division of labor, specialization of tasks, increased education length needed
for particular duties, complex organization ,and technology. Even where
more than one source exists, there may be exploitation o f the voter due to
collusion and parallelism . The theory of oligopoly provides a guide to under
standing those problems.
Biases in the individual's decision-making can also result from the
limitations of his cognitive processes. Social psychologists have hypothesized
a number of such biases. Many could be useful in a theory of democracy.
Here, these processes have only been briefly considered. Cognitive processes
can be represented by statistical models, and in fa c t, a major contribution
of mathematical information theory has been the reshaping of the science of
behavior. The problems, as they relate to the political model, may be
stated as follows: the mind, like the statistician, seeks to learn the most
from the least information necessary. This is done by developing a number
of means of analyzing d a ta . Over the life of the person, he seeks to find
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the most efficient possible system. As in statistics, the same estimators are
not always equally v a lid . We would argue here that some cognitive
processes, developed over centuries, have become antiquated with the
explosion of information in this century. Whether or not information processing
has advanced as quickly as the need for it is subject to question.
N e x t, the thesis is concluded with an analysis of the systematic
effects of these biases on the polity as a whole.
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Chapter 7
Relation to the Spatial Competition Model

Thus fa r, discussion has largely dealt with the effects of information
problems on a single in d iv id u a l. Here we consider the cumulative effects on
society as a whole. A gain, the basis for discussion is the single-issue policy
continuum for X . This can again represent one issue in isolation or Downs's
ideological spectrum. Either uses the same Hotelling model.
Figure 13 shows a population distribution in which n - 1 individuals
lie in fixed positions along the continuum. The x-axis represents the policy
choice while the y-axis represents the number of individuals at that point.
To simplify the discussion for now, it is assumed that there is a two-party
system and that everyone votes. The policy level chosen is the median of
this distribution. For this reason, the particular shape of the distribution is
not a concern.
If an n-th individual is added to the population, the position of the
median w ill shift s lig h tly , unless n is located at that point e x ac tly .

In a

large society, his effect on the median is slight, but not zero. He has an
infinitesimal but real effect on the policies chosen by the parties. Assume
that the original n - 1 people have fixed views; n is the only question
mark for the parties. Figure 14 shows two possible probability distributions
for n's choice. One is a normal distribution around the point he would
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Figure 18
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choose under perfect information. The second distribution shows a distribution
biased in the direction of an information source upon whom n's decision
depends. Perhaps the information source investigated individual n and
calculated an information strategy most like ly to skew his distribution in this
direction. Perhaps they purchased his name from an ideologically oriented
publication and figured that he was of that persuasion. Then information. .
was given to influence someone with that view point. The biases described
in the previous chapters have been developed by marketing analysts, perhaps.
N may still choose his rational point; the point is still within his distribution.
But, in the second distribution, the source has moved to decrease that
probability.

If we assume that the parties have perfect information (by polling

or other technique) then both w ill scurry to the new median point. The
median of society could be exactly where it was before, but there is a high
degree of probability that it w ill be slightly closer to the position of the
information source.
Several additional diagrams illustrate the cumulative effects of the
information source affecting the distributions of many individuals in the way
described above. In Figure 15, many individuals have been led by the source
to probability distributions like n's in the previous diagram. N ow , instead of
an infinitesimal shift, there is a major one. If there is a large number of
individuals, the population distribution should resemble a vertical summation
of a ll individual probability distributions. This makes possible a variety of
different solutions. It is possible (though improbable) that each individual
w ill select the rightmost point in his distribution, in which case the society's
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median (and government choice) w ill be far to the right. N ow , the choice
of society also becomes a probability distribution which is a function of all
the individual curves.
The population distribution need not be normal or any other common
distribution. Figure 16 shows a bimodal distribution. Consider the issue of
defense spending: the two modes can be termed "hawks" and "doves" with
a continuum of shadings, represented here on the right and le ft, respectively.
Assume there is a strong dominance of information disseminated by the hawks.
Many probability curves shift to the right, swelling the hawk side of the
spectrum as in Figure 17. Here, the doves are portrayed as responding in
e ffe c tiv e ly , so one mode shrinks and the other grows. The distribution and
hence the median shifts to the right. Figure 18 shows an alternative possibili
ty . ^he hawk mode swells as before, but the doves respond more e ffec tive ly ,
so that mode grows, too. This represents a polarizing of the electorate.
This may represent a reaction against the information given by the m ilitary.
The leftward swelling may also represent what Robert Dahl called "slack re
sources." 1 This refers to the phenomenon of p o litica lly inactive people
becoming active when their viewpoint is threatened by opposing political
forces.
Downs does not e x p lic itly recognize this skewing of information,
but some normative theorists have.

Some others assume, as Downs does,

that forces in the democratic polity tend to equalize in the long run.3
By pressures like slack resources, the polity is kept toward its true median.
This argument broke down for the individual, and it can do the same for
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the polity as a whole if:
1) Society's true possibilities (the transformation curve) remains hidden
from the electorate because of information manipulation, or
2) Even awareness of the existence of desired information by opposing
groups may not counteract fully if one side is more successful than the other
in disseminating information.
Hawks may shift the curve to the right because for some reason the
doves may be less effective at disseminating facts. Though the latter may
know the information favorable to their view they are unable to speak loudly
enough, in a figurative sense.
G albraith discussed this at length in American Capitalism

and in other

if

later works,

!n that book, he postulated that there would be areas of policy

in which competition would be insufficient to prevent a superiority of power
on one side or another. He suggested the state establishment of "counter
vailing powers"— institutions designed to serve in a capacity like regulatory
agencies.

In Economics and the Public Purpose

he recommended the establish

ment of price-setting mechanisms within the government to serve as competi5

tion where none would form spontaneously.
This view has been criticized as merely a restatement of support for
increased regulatory a c tiv ity . This a c tiv ity has been criticized on questions
of e ffic ie n c y . Figures 19 and 20 demonstrate tendencies of regulatory
agencies. In the former, the information source at I has successfully biased
the population distribution toward its opinion. !h the la tte r, a regulatory
agency has been established as a countervailing power. The agency is at a
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disadvantage compared with the information source. It is not an equal
partner in this market. Scitovsky cited relatively equivalent power as a
g

necessary component of competition. The agency's function is basically
negative, unlike the controlled organization.
The agency may be founded on a purpose to which its employees
may be dedicated. However, effectiveness may be short-lived. The thrust
of the writings of Huntington and others is that the life of a successful
agency is usually fa irly b rie f. Before too many years past, the bifurcation
described earlier occurs, and the agency ceases to carry out its assigned
purpose.
In this chapter, the information problems facing the individual have
been generalized to a polity of many individuals. The thrust of the argument
has been that individuals erring in their choices need not "average out" to
a rational choice as Downs seems to suggest w ill happen.
In the following summary, the results of this thesis w ill be review ed.
D(x)

D(x)

D_(x) from Fig. 19~v

x
Figure 19
Lack of competition biases
population distribution

Figure 20
Regulatory agency reduces but
does not elim inate bias

Notes to Chapter 7

See the discussion of actual versus potential political resources
In Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (N ew Haven: Y a le University Press,
I9 6 1 )," c h . 24.
Recall the discussion on Chapter 6 on cognitive biases. Also, the
Institutional School in economics has written extensively on this supposed
tendency. See G a lb ra ith , The Affluent Society, chs. 9 , 10, 11; and
John Kenneth G a lb ra ith , The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton
M ifflin C o .,

1967), chs. 18, 19, 20.

Downs, pp. 8 -1 1 .
John Kenneth G a lb ra ith , American Capitalism (Boston: Houghton
M ifflin C o ., 1952).
John Kenneth G a lb ra ith , Economics and the Public Purpose (Boston:
Houghton M ifflin C o .,

1973).

Scitovsky, p. 321.

Chapter 8
Summary

This thesis has taken exception with the assumption of rationality as
an approximation for collective behavior in a p o lity . The reason is that the
possible existence of biases in the way people absorb information may cause
their choices to deviate severely from what they would choose in a state of
perfect information. It is argued that these biases may be systematic and thus
not "average out" as the rational actor model would im ply. Further, it is
argued that these biases might occur most severely in the presence of a high
degree of specialization, dependence upon expert opinion for information,
and lengthy time horizons for the effects of choices.
The thesis has been presented in the form of a critique of Anthony
Downs's An Economic Theory of Democracy. This book, considered a seminal
work in the field of positive p o litical theory, was outlined Chapter 1 .
The questions considered in the thesis and the methods employed in the
critique are outlined in Chapter 2 . The critique begins with an explanation
of the significance of the rational actor in theory. Chapter 3 considers the
construct and adds a particular form of uncertainty to the model. This is
done to enable analysis of situations in which the individual deviates from
rational choice. Competition and its role as a process for

disseminating

information are considered in Chapter 4 . This includes a discussion of the
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failure of competition in certain markets and the effect of this failure on
decision-making. Chapter 5 argues that where competitive forces fa il, it
should be expected that information sources w ill collude or act in parallel
fashion at the expense of those needing the information. Chapter 6 lists
a number of hypothetical ways an individual may bias the information he
receives. A number of heuristic methods are considered. Chapter 7 considers
the effects of these information problems on a polity of many individuals,
arguing that under certain circumstances, systematic biases should occur.
The choice of An Economic Theory of Democracy as the subject of
the critique is justified by several reasons. The work has been considered by
some theoreticians to be the best of its genre.1

It forms the point of de

parture for a sizable number of other works of positive political theory and
2

the theory of the economics of social choice.

The book is representative

of a large body of p o litical and economic theory in its use of the rational
individuality assumption, the self-interest axiom , and treatment of informa
tion in some ways as a homogeneous commodity w hich, if supplied costlessly,
w ill necessarily increase the individual's expected u tility .
The argument of this thesis is that theory of this type has been un
able thusfar to incorporate into models a number of the key determinants of
po licy. These include large organizations (bureaucratic, corporate, e t c .) ,
specialization of the labor force, heterogeneity of information, parallel
actions by large numbers of individuals, and deliberate biasing of informa
tion without sufficient information to the contrary being obtainable.
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The theoretical construct of the rational Individual has been a useful
tool In the analysis of certain types of economic markets and polities. It is
not without its limitations, though. It may be useful in situations in which
information is fairly simple (the cost of repairing shovels, the expected
yield of a crop under given circumstances, e t c .) . But, the true costs and
benefits of building nuclear power plants>~ medical research, funding of
various long-term government programs, and genetic engineering are not
clear to laymen and probably not even to experts. Since the individual must
rely on experts for this information, his decisions may be biased in the direc
tion of their opinions or what he perceives to be their opinions; d? in the case
of distrust, he may be biased improperly away from their opinions. It is not
d iffic u lt to make the case that the interests of laymen and experts w ill not
always coincide. Where their interests diverge can determine how the formers'
utilities are affected by information problems. The expert may have the
a b ility both to bias the information the layman receives and to predict the
manner in which the layman's heuristic processes w ill further bias information
received. The individual may be relatively powerless at times to combat this
susceptibility.
Im plicit in much of information theory is a b e lie f that "more is b e tte r."
In other words, if an individual is given an additional costless increment of
information, it is assumed that ceteris paribus his expected u tility w ill be at
least as high, and possibly higher than before. However, situations can be
shown where this is not true. An individual deciding whether or not to have
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surgery has some expected u tility , given the information structure from which
his decision probabilities are derived. If he can get a costless increment of
information, it w ill be likely to come from a doctor. If advice from the
medical profession as a whole is biased , increasing his amount of information
may only bias his decision further. Additional information may lower his
expected u tility — a proposition seldom seen in the economic literature of

_

information. Conceivably, if an infinite amount of costless advice were a v a il
able to the individual, he could go to medical school and found a research
center to help in his decision-m aking. But, this is not feasible, so small
increments of information must suffice.
This thesis has defined the systematic biases in ’ the polity as occurring
either in the structure of the information itself or in the way individuals in
society interpret the information they receive. The first occurs if the information
the individual receives, randomly processed, would lead him to an expected
decision other than his preference under perfect information. The second bias,
primarily heuristic, leads the individual to bias even in itia lly unbiased informa
tio n .
Either of these tendencies to systematically bias the individual's choice
can be manipulated by an information source more knowledgable in some
aspect of the transaction . Furthermore, the self-interest axiom would lead us
to believe that if this can be done, it w ill whenever the interests of the
source come into p lay.
The argument can be made that these systematic biases might become
more severe given certain situations. Increased specialization could be a
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source of bias since individuals would tend to know more about their own
occupations and less about the occupations whose products bear directly on
their u tility . Longer time horizons for technology would also be a conceivable
source of bias. The realities of modern technology are such that estimating
the true long term costs and benefits of particular policies becomes less and
less exact.
The problems involved here bear especially on economic and positive
po litical models which use tacit or e x p licit assumptions concerning the com
petitiveness of the information sources in society. The social benefit of
competition can be interpreted as the providing of a conflicting mass of
information out of which the individual can derive a more advantageous
choice than might otherwise be possible. Monopoly in production or infor
mation or political power may have as its greatest cost the stifling of the
forces of intellectual conflict which determine the possibilities for society.
No attempt is made here to determine the relative advantages of
particular levels of technology and specialization. The point made by this
thesis is that the realities of these factors require fundamentally different
ways of studying society's institutions and processes.
A large firm may not perform as just a large version of a small firm .
A technology whose effects extend for centuries may require a different kind
of scrutiny than one whose time horizon is a year or tw o. N ear total reliance
of individuals on the information provided by experts may not average out
to the perfect information solution. In the presence of technologies, informa-
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tion becomes a highly heterogeneous commodity, and the way individuals
and society as a whole process it becomes crucial in the determination of
policy and transactions.
The problems of information biases discussed here may be of an
especially severe nature in a po litical setting as opposed to an economic
setting. In economic markets, it can be argued, the true costs and benefits
may at least be approximated by the price system, excess supplies and
demands, profits, and other measurable quantities. Determining and defining
po litical successes and failures is a far more elusive task. The logic of
voters and politicians in such a "market11 is based on decisions made under
circumstances of great uncertainty and variance of perception. The "commodi
ties" purchased by the voter are highly amorphous goods, if they can be
called th a t. The voter is uncertain, as Downs states, of the politician's
true beliefs, policies, a b ilities, and other qualities. . Unlike the purchase of
a simple economic good, comparison of entire ideologies might be subject
to a variance too great for the rationality model. Sim ilarly, the decisions
of the politicians are made under circumstances of wide uncertainty.
There is no a priori reason to believe the decisions of those in
p o litical markets approximate rational decision-making. Reasons have been
offered why the system w ill tend to be biased. The implication is that if
a theoretician believes the rational individual model provides a closer
approximation of the truth than other models, then it should be used. If
not, a better approximation should be sought.
Thus, the intention of this thesis has been to suggest a direction in
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which research could move in politics and economics. The intention is also
to suggest that without accounting for these significant factors, models w ill
continue to have far less explanatory power than they could.
In particular, the direction suggested is the inclusion in positive
po litical models certain aspects of information theory and social psychology.
Information theory can provide a probabilistic basis with which to hypothe
size the arguments of the thesis. Social psychology suggests several areas in
which these hypotheses might be developed. The result can be models signifi
cantly richer in analytical power than those currently in existence, and if so,
they w ill have served some useful purpose in providing closer approximations of
fa c t.
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Notes to Chapter 8

1.

See comments Brian Barry, Sociologists, Economists, and Demo
cracy (London: The Macm illan Company, 1970), p . 24; and Karl W .
Deutsch, "Q uantitative Approach to Political Analysis: Some Past
Trends and Future Prospects," in Hayward P. A lk e r, J r ., Karl W .
Deutsch, and Antoine H . Stoetzel, eds., Mathematical Approaches
to Politics (Washington: Jossey-Bass, In c .,

2.

Publishers, 1973), p. 1.

For example, Barry, Sociologists, ch. 2; and Gordon Tullock,
Toward a Mathematics of Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1967), ch. 4 .
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APPENDIX

The following economic terms are defined and described at length in
Edwin M ansfield, Economics: Principles, Problems, Decisions, 2nd ed. (N ew
York: W .W . Norton and Company, In c ., 1977).
Economic term
—
Collusion.............................................
Com petition........................................

Consumer.............................................
Demand C urve....................................
Equilibrium...........................................
Indifference curves (map) ...........
M a rk e t.................................................
Monopoly.............................................
O lig o p o ly.............................................
Product Transformation C u r v e ....
Rational C hoice...............................
Specialization (division of labor)
Supply C urve......................................
U tility ...................................................
W e lfa re .................................................

Pages in Mansfield

5917^ 3-94
5 0 , 5 9 , 84, 5 3 5 -4 0 , 5 5 6 -6 3 , 5 6 9 -7 1 ,
5 77, 5 8 1 -8 2 , 5 9 2 -9 5 , 6 0 1 -2 , 6 1 3 -1 4 ,
6 2 1 -2 6 , 662, 6 85-97
5 8 , 6 0 , 69, 83, 111, 4 6 1 -8 0 , 5 0 1-0 2
29, 6 0 -6 1 , 6 6 -6 8 , 9 7 -9 8 , 4 8 4 -5 0 5 ,
5 6 5 -6 , 5 8 4 -8 6 , 6 2 1 -2 5 , 638-40
6 4 -6 7
4 7 4 -7 6 , 505
59, 6 0 -6 3 , 7 5 -7 6 , 84
418, 5 56, 5 6 3 -7 4 , 577, 5 8 1 -8 2 , 5 9 8 603, 662
556, 577, 5 8 3 -9 6 , 600-01
4 3 -4 9 , 112-13, 3 9 0 -9 1 , 7 1 3-1 4
469
21-22
6 2 -6 3 , 5 4 0 -4 2 , 559-61
4 6 4 -6 5 , 475-76
6 9 2 -9 3 , 6 95-97

The following statistical terms can be found in Judith D . Handel,
Introductory Statistics for Sociology (Englewood C liffs -N .J .:P re n tic e -H a ll,
In c .,

1978).

Biased Estimators......................................
Efficient Estimators....................................
M ean ........................................................
Probabilities.................................................
Skew............................................................ ..
V a ria n c e ........................................................

295, 302
295-96
1 0 3 -4 , 199-200, 217
243-80
84, 294-95
103-04, 199-200, 217
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